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EMERGING CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCING
PRIVATE COLLEGES WITH PUBLIC MONEY
MICHAEL R. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION

Efforts to devise valid statutes to secure aid for elementary
and secondary church-related schools will undoubtedly continue.
But recent Supreme Court decisions have effectively foreclosed
possible plans for obtaining such aid. One obstacle to establishing the constitutionality of state funding may be the acceptance
by the Court of writings by religious educators defining their
schools as instruments of their affiliated religion. By viewing
the schools as integral parts of the churches, aid to the schools
may become synonymous with aid to religion. This creates an
"insoluble paradox." To avoid conflict with the religious clauses
of the first amendment, guarantees of secular usage of public
aid are required.' However, any such guarantees will probably
necessitate such close state surveillance and regulation as to excessively entangle the state with religion.'
Much federal aid continues to flow to lower level churchrelated schools. However, the assistance does not go directly to
the schools. Almost all state aid is in the form of fringe-benefits, directed at underprivileged children.' These forms require
the cooperation of, and administration by, state school authorities.
State officials can be by-passed, however, allowing for aid directly from the federal government to private schools. The legality of such action is far from certain. The complexity of federal
acts, involving multiple choices of aid combinations, has hampered
*Dr. Smith is an Assistant Professor at Pfeiffer College, a Methodist-related school located in Misenheimer, North Carolina. He is co-author of
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: THE LEGALITY OF USING PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS (1972).
1. See note 49 ifra and accompanying text.
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
A comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions [on the use
of public money] are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected. . . . These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement between state and church.

Id. at 619.
3. Eg., Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended,
20 U.S.C. § 241 (1974).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 5

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

562

[Vol. 9

the structure of an effective court challenge, especially since taxpayers did not have the standing to attack federal spending programs until 1968." In a recent case, where public school officers
were permitted to offer private schools in their district comparable rather than identical forms of federal aid, the Supreme Court
declined to decide the legality of such aid.5 The Court did say
that "the range of possibilities is a broad one and the First
Amendment implications may vary according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated."' In light of the trend of
recent decisions against state aid to parochial schools, Justices on
each side of the issue expressed surprise at the possible disparity
in the majority opinion. Viewing the possibility that federal aid
might be upheld, Mr. Justice White declared in his concurring
opinion: "If this is the case, I suggest that the Court say so
expressly."" Dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas agreed, indicating
that if state aid to private schools is unconstitutional, "[w]e
should say so now, and save the endless hours and efforts which
hopeful people will expend in an effort to constitutionalize what
is impossible without a constitutional amendment."'
The Court has not held that unrestricted state aid granted
directly to private schools is constitutional. It has determined,
however, that limited forms of federal and state aid may be constitutionally extended to church-related colleges and universities.
These decisions, one in 1971,' and the other in 1973,

°

have spurred

legislative attempts to release still more aid to private colleges
and have heightened interest in the legality of such efforts. The
first part of this paper is an analysis of the college-aid question.
Following that is the presentation of applicable federal and state
supreme court decisions.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLLEGE-Am QUESTION

The HistoricalSituation
Public as well as private colleges are plagued by inflationary
troubles. A critical difference between public and private institutions, however, is the extent to which the colleges rely upon
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Wheeler v. Barrera, 94 S.Ct. 2274 (1974).
Id. at 2287.
Id. at 2289 (White, J. concurring).
Id. at 2290 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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tuition to cover their expenses. Direct costs to students in private higher educational institutions is currently about sixty percent, as opposed to twenty-three percent in public colleges." As
costs rise, public schools look to increased support from tax revenues. Private schools may step up requests for gifts from the
limited number of philanthropic sources. If such sources cannot
cover higher expenditures, further tuition increases are a must
for private colleges to maintain their quality. Therein lies a cruel
irony. As tuitions rise, public schools grow proportionately more
attractive, and the pool of students from which private school
costs must be gathered grows increasingly smaller.
Many believe that only public funds can break the circle.
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, for example, has
identified private colleges as "the institutions now in the greatest financial difficulty" and has called for various forms of state
and federal assistance.' 2 To defend the call for state aid to private institutions, the Commission cites these institutions' valuable
Dequalities of diversity and ease of implementing innovation.
spite this need for state aid, the history and literature of the
problem, as well as state and federal constitutions, offer minimal
suggestions for modern solutions.
Little is gained by looking for historical precedents for public aid to private colleges. Schools at all levels, both public and
private, initially received considerable public support." Among
the many colleges which received early public assistance were
Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, William and Mary, and Yale. By
1874. Harvard had already accepted more than $500,000 and
46,000 acres of public land.' But the need for education was so
great that there was little or no competition among denominations
for public dollars. "People were only too happy to have any kind
of school established that would provide young people with elements of learning."'"
Equally unprofitable are efforts to identify when or why
public assistance began to wane. One author points out that
11. D. HALSTEAD, STATEWIDE PLANNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 555 (U.S.
Government Printing Office 1974) [hereinafter cited as D. HALSTEAD].
12. PRIORITIES FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION 66 (1973).

13. Id.
14. W. McFARLANE AND C. WHEELER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF
STATE AID FOR PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (1971).

15.
16.

Id. at 11.
M. RYAN, ARE PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS THE ANSWER 4 (1964).
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American higher education began neither as public nor
private . . . the distinction between state and private
education is, in the history of higher education in our
country, a comparatively recent distinction. 7
Another has observed that,
immigration as well as schisms in established denominations brought about a proliferation of sects, so that by
1840 the separation of church and state had taken place
in every state within the union."
Likewise, writers on each side of the public-aid-to-privateschools question find support in the first amendment. The religious clauses of that amendment command that, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ."" That prescription seems simple enough. Yet a case can be made for both sides from history
and various writings of the men influencing interpretation of the
first amendment. Established churches existed in most of the
newly formed states, and there is no evidence that the framers
of the first amendment intended to disestablish them. On the
other hand, the amendment was heavily influenced by the work
of Patrick Henry, champion of religious freedom, author of Virginia's Bill of Rights, and accepted authority on church and state
separation. Nor can Madison or Jefferson be overlooked, especially the former's Remonstrance against paying even "three
pence" in support of another man's religion, and the latter's
famous interpretation of the first amendment as "a wall of separation between Church and State."20
Attempting to find answers in the fourteenth amendment is
a final exercise in futility. The fourteenth amendment provides
that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law... ."" Through the fourteenth amend17. A. Pfnister, Developing Relationships between Public and Private
Higher Education, NEw DIRECTIONS IN STATEWIDE HIGHER EDUCATION PLANNING AND COORDINATION 38-39 (Proceedings of the 19th Southern Regional
Educational Board Legislative Work Conference 1970).

18. P. Rossi and A. Rossi, Some Effects of ParochialSchool Education
in America, in SOCIETY AND EDUCATION: A BOOK OF READIN s 205 (J. Havighurst, B. Neugarten and J. Falk, ed. 1967).
19. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
20. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
21. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
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ment, the first amendment was made binding on the states in
1940. " The first became "absorbed" into the fourteenth amendment--as have most other amendments." But the first is unlike
all other amendments. It commands that no law be made respecting an establishment of religion. Applying the fourteenth amendment to the first amendment might be considered a violation at
the outset. The fourteenth then becomes a law respecting religion.
There is evidence suggesting that the framers never intended
the fourteenth to incorporate the first amendment. Only seven
years after passage of the fourteenth amendment, the Fortyfourth Congress debated a proposal that would have limited the
states in the same manner as the first amendment limits Congress. The proposal passed the House, twenty-four members of
which had been framers of the fourteenth amendment, but failed
in the Senate.2 ' However, these points are academic-the fact is
that states as well as Congress are now bound by the religious
clauses of the first amendment.
Even before the first amendment was made applicable to the
states, state supreme courts strictly enforced their own constitutions which prohibited the grant of public funds for religious
schools, including colleges.2 Though in recent years constitutional
revisions have in some instances loosened restrictions on public
aid to religious institutions,26 most states have retained their religious-freedom clauses intact. Many specifically bar aid to colleges. For example, South Carolina's constitution prohibits state
assistance,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance of any college . .. which is wholly or in part under the direction

or control of any church or of any religious or sectarian
denomination, society, or organization.2 '
Illustrative of early decisions of state supreme courts and
the contentions of the parties is an 1891 South Dakota case on
tuition payments to Pierre University:
[L] earned counsel for plaintiff strenuously contends that
the sum due plaintiff will not be contributed for the
22.

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
IN MEMORIAM, HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, 92 S. Ct. Preface 21 (1971).
24. 4 CONG. REc. 5189-91 (1875).
25. E.g., Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942). See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645-47 (1971).

23.

26.
27.

See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 630 (1971).
S.C. CONST., art. XI, § 9.
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benefit of or to aid the university, but in payment for
services rendered the state, or to its students, in preparing them for teaching in the public schools. This contention, while plausible, is, we think, unsound and leads
to absurd results. If the state can pay the tuition of 25
students, why may it not maintain at the institution all
that the institution can accommodate, and thereby support the instituion entirely by state funds.28
The same line of reasoning runs through other, similar state
supreme court decisions." Indeed, Virginia's Supreme Court, as
late as 1955, held that grants to pay for the tuition of war veterans' orphans to private religious colleges violated the State
Constitution, 3 in that "tuition fees are the very 'life blood' of
institutions.""
Current Trends
Constitutional considerations notwithstanding, public dollars
are finding their way into private colleges.
Despite constitutional State prohibitions against direct
appropriations of tax funds to private or sectarian institutions, at least 34 States support private higher education. All 34 of these States provide some form of financial aid to students attending private colleges and
universities and 20 also provide institutional support.
State programs supporting private institutions include
aid for construction through tax-exempt bond issues
or matching grants (12 States); contractual arrangements for educational services and student enrollment
(5 States); and direct grants, with or without restrictions (17 States).-1
These findings were reported in 1972. Since then, the number
of court decisions and the extensive media coverage suggest a
significant increase in the number of states interested in aiding
private colleges.
Forms of aid to private college students largely fall into
categories of either low-cost loans or tuition grants. The low28.

Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).

29. See, e.g., Cook County v. Industrial School, 125 Ill. 540, 18 N.E.
183 (1888).
30. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
31. D. HALSTEAD, supra note 11, at 594.
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cost loans can be repaid by other than monetary methods, such
as teaching for five years. Regarding typical operation of the
latter, students applying to or enrolled at private colleges petition the state for assistance under the program. Assuming the
student qualifies (is a state resident or demonstrates financial
need), he is accepted. Acceptance amounts to notifying the student that money will be extended to his private college on his
behalf or requiring him to sign a voucher over to his college.
Either way, in practice, the student never sees the money. Generally, though not always, participation is restricted to private,
academically-oriented, in-state colleges. 2
Forms of aid to the private colleges include categorical assistance in financing construction projects, "contracts" for educating state residents in special areas, such as dental education,
and even outright unrestricted grants. Construction assistance
may simply amount to aid in raising revenue, by selling state
bonds, to be cancelled by the schools. The advantage of this assistance is the absence of tax on interest paid to bondholders, which
results in an interest cost to the college lower than that required
by conventional bonds. This form of aid has won the approval
of the United States Supreme Court." Another type of aid to
private colleges upheld by the United States Supreme Court is
federal construction assistance under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. 3
Both Congress and state legislatures have employed various
rationales to support their actions authorizing aid to private institutions. The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963"5 is defended on national security and general welfare considerations.
It may be argued that it is within the state's interest in public
welfare to aid private educational institutions.
Frequently stated purposes of state laws aiding students include a willingness to assist students in their selection of a public or private school and efforts to save the state money. By
financially encouraging students to attend private schools, the
state is relieved from costly construction, and from hiring additional faculty members, at public colleges.
32. See generally D. HALSTEAD, supra note 11.
33. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
34. Act of Dec. 16, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 101, 77 Stat. 364. Held
constitutional in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
35. Id.
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If either of the avowed objectives of the states is successfully accomplished, student enrollment at private colleges should
at least tend toward stabilization. Whether that result is being
realized is largely a matter of conjecture, as definitive studies do
not yet exist."' However, the Carnegie Commission has revised
its predictions about upward enrollment patterns at public and
private colleges. Commenting on the drop in student enrollment,
as well as the "drastic" drop in the birth rate, the Commission
noted,
we would now caution greater conservation in planning for
new campuses or in expanding old campuses or in undertaking new construction than we evidenced in our recommendations even two years ago.3"
Outlook for the Future
Responsible discussion of future public funding of private
colleges must be based on Supreme Court decisions on aid to all
levels of private schools and on federal and state court collegeaid decisions since 1971. In 1971, the Court rendered its first
decision on public assistance to private colleges. 8 At the heart of
the issue was the first amendment's applicability to church-related
college-aid recipients. The principles or "tests" used by the Court
evolved from cases on aid to lower level parochial schools. 9
Insight on the question of future aid to private colleges can
be gained by referring to the chart, Supreme Court Decisions,
The First Amendment and Aid to Church-Related Schools. This
chart shows the types of aid to all private school levels that have
36. By themselves, neither enrollment figures nor data on failing private colleges fairly indicate the impact of state aid on enrollment. The question
is what would the picture look like in the absence of state aid.

37.

PRIORITIES FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION

ON HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (1973).

38.
39.

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Id. at 685.
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SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND AID TO CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS*
Direct Indirect Indirect Direct
Form of Aid
School Students Secular Sectarian
Level of School
Purpose Purpose
Elementary and
Secondary:
composite profile of relation
of church to
schools-close
integral part.

Transportation

yes

yes

Textbooks

yes

yes

Sale of secular
educational
services to state

no

no

no

Tuition reimbursements to parents

no

no

no

no

Tax credits to
parents

no

no

no

no

Salaries of
teachers of
secular subjects

no

no

no

no

Grants for maintenance and repair

no

no

no

no

Reimbursements to
school for state
required recordkeeping

no

no

no

no

Colleges and
Construction grants
Universities:
composite profile
of relation of
Aid in selling
church to schoolsbonds for conrejected by Court,
struction purposes
as aid has been
restricted to
limited uses at
individual schools

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

*"Yes" indicates the rationale under which the form of aid was approved;
"'no" simply means the aid was found invalid.
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been approved or disapproved by the United States Supreme
Court. Note the two constitutional forms of assistance at elementary and secondary levels: transportation and textbooks. Both
have been approved under the so-called "child-benefit" theory."'
In addition to limiting aid to students, rather than schools, both
forms of assistance were seen as secular-or "indirect aid"-as
compared to more direct aid such as teachers' salaries." However,
the Court has recently declared that those state aids permitted
through the child-benefit rationale approach the "verge of the
constitutionally impermissible."' 2 Further, though the states may
provide parochial school students with books and transportation,
they are not constitutionally required to do so.'"
Aid permitted at the college level has also been characterized
as secular-though more direct than aid to primary and secondary schools."' Assistance to the schools for funding construction
is an example. The limited purpose of this type of aid, in addition to the lack of a need for annual reassessments, such as tuition grants require, weighed heavily in the Court's opinion.'
Further, the Court distinguished the religiously permeated atmosphere of elementary and secondary parochial schools from the
collegiate environment. At a distance from individual colleges,
the Court reasoned that the age and sophistication of college students, coupled with the academic freedom of professors necessarily
produce an environment less permeated with religion than at lower
school levels."6
Clarity is achieved by viewing the question as a continuum.
On the left, is a private-secular institution. On the right, is a
church, and adjoining it are its elementary and secondary schools.
The state is totally free to achieve its educational ends through
secular, private means, but is equally restricted from working
through the church. Private church-related colleges, as a class,
have been placed a little short of the right side. The more distance individual colleges put between themselves and the right
side-that is, the more secular they become-the more public aid
they might expect.
40. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran v.
Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
41. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
42. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
43. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd
mem., 95 S.Ct. 167 (1974).
44. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
45. Id."
46. Id.
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Directions from Tilton v. Richardson and Hunt v. McNair
The United States Supreme Court has now decided two cases
concerning the first amendment and public aid to church-related
colleges."' Certain inferences can be drawn from these decisions.
First, there might not be a wall of separation between the "Church
and State" after all. It is doubtful that the wall ever existed. The
Court attempts to minimize contacts between religion and government which might lead on the one hand to state support, sponsorship, or active involvement in religion; and on the other, to state
suppression of religion. However, church-related colleges are involved with the state on a number of levels and for numerous
purposes. Among other things, their very ability to confer degrees depends upon the state. Thus, there is a presumption at
the outset of a certain degree of contact between religiouslyaffiliated colleges and government.
The next two inferences concern a state's ability to achieve
its secular educational ends through religiously-affiliated institutions. Firstly, control over an institution by persons all of one
faith cannot in itself deter the state from working through it.
Prior to the college-aid decisions, it was not clear whether the
state could legally achieve its ends in such a religiously homogeneous atmosphere." Secondly, even though aid from the state for
secular purposes may allow religiously-affiliated institutions to
utilize their own funds for religious ends, the state's ability to
work through them is not hampered by that fact per se.
Additional inferences may be drawn by examining the "tests"
so far used by the Court in determining the constitutionality of
acts which aid church-related colleges. First, the purpose for
which the aid is used must be a "secular legislative purpose."
This standard was established in a case involving lower level
parochial schools in 1963."' Neither the act in that case, nor any
act since-in federal or state courts-has failed to pass this test.
Legislators have been careful to include in the drafting of statutes a statement of secular purposes. Second, an act's primary
effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion."0 Third, the act
may not foster excessive governmental entanglement with reli47. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973).
48. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Speer v. Colbert,

200 U.S. 130 (1906).
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50. Id.
51. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
49.
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gion.5 ' Entanglement might be fostered by (1) strict surveillance
required to guarantee secular usage of funds;" (2) regulations
which thrust the state into the everyday affairs of a churchrelated school;"3 (3) arrangements requiring continuing affiliation between church and state, increasing the likelihood of political divisions along religious lines." '
Thus, to pass the second test, and in part the third test, a college may not have a relationship with its affiliated church close
enough to permeate all of its functions with religion. If it does, it
would be impossible to restrict aid to the college's secular purpose.
But for this reason, the party who has challenged acts stated to be
restricted to secular purposes has been required to assume the burden of proving the ineligibility of individual colleges."
Certainly statutes should be presumed constitutional, but the
task of overturning them ought not be prohibitive. The Court, in
rejecting a composite profile of college sectarianism, has distinguished between the role of religion in lower and higher levels of
church-related schools." In doing so, the Court relied primarily
upon the age and sophisticated minds of college students, the absence of restrictive student admission or faculty hiring policies,
the absence of overt indoctrination practices, and upon the presence of academic freedom on college campuses."' The fact that
the Court's distinction is an acknowledged departure from its
previous decisions, coupled with mere fairmindedness, justifies
questioning the Court's assumptions.
Perhaps a good beginning is made by asking whether the
state should initiate a policy of advancing the cumulative cause
of any group bound by religious, anti-religious, racial, or any other
ideology? Naturally, few colleges openly discriminate among students and faculty on the basis of religion. Honest scholars-students as well as faculty-even of the school's religion, might well
be abhorred, and stay away. Such a practice, wherever followed,
surely would have damaging consequences for a private school
seeking public funds. But the fact is, as the cases show, most
church-related colleges do have student bodies and faculties composed predominantly of the affiliated religion. This, of course,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Hunt v. McNair, 431
Id.
Tilton v. Richardson,
Hunt v. McNair, 413
Tilton v. Richardson,
Id.
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results from individuals, at least in part, choosing to go to a college which is sympathetic to their religious philosophy-a college
which is affiliated by design with their faith. In such a homogeneous religious environment, it is probable that atheists and
persons of markedly different faiths might feel uncomfortable.
The state considers these facts when deciding whether or not to
allow aid to a church-related school. To emphasize the point, one
need only ask whether a state would start afresh a policy of financially supporting a group known to have been drawn together
even partly by common ideals regarding anti-religion or race.
Many of the above considerations also assume that academic
freedom, at any reputable college, is a "given." But with a faculty
primarily of one faith, or certainly of religious believers, and
mainly Christian, the issue of true academic freedom can legitimately be challenged. There cannot be any patent attempt to control a professor's teaching, for again, that would draw the wrath
of the entire academic community. But whether by choice, happenstance, or administrative design, a faculty might well fall into
a conservative, denominational one-mindedness. The cumulative
effect on the student could be opposite of that expected from
scholarship free of religious parochialism.
The same line of reasoning might be pursued with respect
to the Court's observation about proselytism. A systematic policy
of religious indoctrination would not only be resisted by students
and faculty, but it would be the worst possible means of inculcation, even if that were a college's objective. As the Court points
out, college students are sophisticated, and a blatant policy of indoctrination would be at odds with sophisticated minds.58 Rather,
subtlety would be demanded.
The heaviest part of the burden of proving that a college is
infused with religion would lie in identifying those subtleties.
Ironically, only those who most need state aid, the students and
professors of private schools, are best situated to isolate the subtleties. Copious descriptions of colleges' methods of inculcation, such
as those at lower level schools, do not exist. How then could an
average citizen come to learn of:
a) prayer at student and faculty meetings and the
extent of informal group pressure on would-be dissenters
to accept such prayer;
58.

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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b) the percentage of speakers visting the campus
who are proponents of the church which is affiliated
with the college;
c) limits on student freedom (normally enjoyed by
public college students) regarding drinking alcoholic beverages, dormitory or other parietal issues, i.e., the student press;
d) the overall effect of religiously orented pamphlets printed by the college and other such literature;
e) pressures on faculty members to manifest a philosophy or at least a manner of living in keeping with a
church-related college.5"
One is pressed to conclude that garnering such evidence would
require the efforts of a person on most intimate terms with a
particular college.
The collective force of these and other factors would not
equal the level of orientation and inculcation found in churchrelated elementary schools. But a Christian posture bent in a
particular direction is there. At the very least, the church-related
college is less of an omnium-gatherum than a public college. That
this fact varies in degree from one church-related college to the
next merely compounds the difficulty of proving it.
Trends in Lower Level Federal Courts and in State Courts
Since the Supreme Court's first decision on public aid to
church-related colleges in Tilton, there have been decisions on
twelve states' statutes which provided public funding of their
church-related colleges.6 Excluding the United States Supreme
Court decisions, the following picture appears:
59.

For a description of such pressures, see Weiss v. O'Brien, 82 Wash.

2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973).
60. For these cases, and the statutes involved in each see notes 133-246,
infra and accompanying text.
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Number of
States

Form of Aid

Type of Court

Type' of Decision
Rendered

2

Student loans

State Supreme

Both valid (one
limited repayment
options for
church-related
college students
to money or bona
fide state
service)

2

Bands-state
aid in selling for construction
funds

State Supreme

Both valid

I

Contract for
dental education services

State Supreme

Invalid

2

Unrestricted
grants to
colleges

One State
Supreme, one
Federal District

Both valid

5

Tuition grants
to students

Two Federal ----- One invalid; one
valid in part
District
(depending on
the colleges
in question)
Three State -------- All invalid
Supreme
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Examination of the data reveals keen interest by states in
unrestricted grants. Ultimately there is little difference in the
effects of the acts of the last seven states. A technical distinction might be that "tuition" grants go to students. But the net
result between those grants and grants to colleges amounts to a
distinction without a difference, since both types end up in the
colleges' coffers. Once the funds are received by the colleges,
there are no enforceable restrictions on their usage."'
Logic might also dictate that unrestricted grants will have
the most appeal and occupy the future time of legislatures and
the courts. As noted above, student enrollment is dropping, and
that decrease should curtail interest in construction grants. Further depression on building plans is supplied by the increasing
significance of post-construction operating costs. But even for surviving construction interests, eleemosynary funds are frequently
available, as a building usually bears the name of a benefactor.
The unrestricted nature of tuition grants and other grants, similar in effect, creates vulnerability to an effective court challenge.
Because funds can be mixed in with a college's general revenues
and used for any (including religious) purposes, risk of state
support of religion is greater.
All of the courts, regardless of their decisions, were troubled
by the absence of restrictions in grant programs. A basic query
is whether an unrestricted grant is not in fact an outright gift.
The Supreme Court would plainly bar gifts of public taxes for
religious purposes.2 If church-related colleges are free to increase
their tuition by the amount of the grants, the effect of tuition
grants is cancelled. Does that action convert the funds from assistance to students to gifts for colleges? Some courts indicated
that all students enrolled in any public or private higher education program (not simply academic), in an in-state or out-of-state
college, ought to be included in the grant program. 3 Others did
not agree, but were sensitive to criticism that statutes limited to
private (of which most are sectarian) colleges do not have a "secular legislative purpose.""' Indeed, there exists the very real ques61. Some of the acts do include statements directing the colleges to use
the funds only for secular purposes. See Roemer v. Board of Public Works
of the State of Maryland, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974). Most do not,
however, and even with those that do, compliance is based on good faith.
62. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 692 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 129, 219 N.W.2d 726, 730

(1974).
64. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Bubb,
379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974).
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tion of whether acts of unrestricted aid do not ipso facto fail
that test.
Another recurring concern was the prospect that annual bids
for increased aid would embroil the state in squabbles and cause
political divisiveness along religious lines. In the Supreme Court
decisions upholding aid, the Court noted their anxiety over the
possibility of these problems."
A noteworthy occurrence in the most recent federal district
court decision," and in the most recent state supreme court decision,6 was acceptance of an overall profile of sectarianism on
church-related campuses. The district court distinguished unrestricted tuition grants from acts upheld by the Supreme Court.
In absence of restrictions on aid to the secular functions of individual colleges, the court reasoned, it may be assumed that some
of the state's funds will be used to advance religion."8 The district court did indicate that a tuition grant phrased to limit funds
to secular uses might win approval,
provided that the statute excluded those schools where
religious indoctrination so permeated the school that separation of the secular and sectarian functions would
be impossible and, further, that the administration of
the restrictions would not result in "exce.ssive entanglem ent.

,6 9

Perhaps administration of restrictions was as great a concern to most courts as the lack of such restrictions. The Supreme
Court has indicated an unwillingness to go along with acts which
force state regulating authorities into the role of college administrators."0 However, acts approved by the Court have provided for
surveillance to ensure proper use of funds and for remedies in
case of non-compliance or default."
Underlying much of the courts' uneasiness was the possibility of using unrestricted funds to pay teachers' salaries. The Su65.

Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403

U.S. 672 (1971).
66. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Dunn, 384
F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
67. State ex rot. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
68. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Dunn, 384
F. Supp. 714, 721 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
69. Id. at 722 n.9.
70. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
71. Ld.at 741.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 5

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

578

(Vol. 9

preme Court's approval of construction assistance rested, in no
small measure, on the nonideological nature of the aid. In fact,
the Court stated:
Since teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral,
greater governmental surveillance would be required to
guarantee that state salary aid would not in fact subsidize religious instruction."
But surveillance of teaching in church-related colleges would
virtually end academic freedom-one of the distinctions relied
upon to justify aid to higher education. At the college level, the
concept of academic freedom would probably carry the load of
ensuring secular teaching. Even assuming a surveillance enforcement scheme could be devised, how could the state recover the
public's money, should sectarian teaching be uncovered?
THE CONSEQUENCES
Trading Religion for Dollars
Aid to church-related colleges has only been recently tested
in the courts. State aid was motivated by the federal acts of 1958
and 1963."3 Congressional spending programs could not be challenged until 1968," 4 and no direction came from state courts until
1966."5 In an attack on matching grants from the state for construction purposes at private (including church-related) colleges,
Maryland was the first state to formulate the issues.7" Since
Maryland has no specific constitutional provision on grants to
religious groups, the State's court of appeals attempted to separate sectarian from secular colleges for purposes of these first
amendment actions. To decide whether an individual school was
secular or sectarian, the following factors were examined:
(1) the stated purposes of the college; (2) the college
personnel, which includes the governing board, the administrative officers, the faculty and the student body
(with considerable importance being placed on the substantiality of religious control over the governing board
72. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971).
73. National Defense Education Act of 1958, 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-602 (1974);
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 101, 77 Stat. 364.
74. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
75. Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220
A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied., 385 U.S. 96 (1966).

76.

Id.
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as a criterion of whether a college is sectarian) ; (3) the
college's relationship with religious organizations and
groups, which relationship includes the extent of ownership, financial assistance, the college's memberships and
affiliations, religious purposes, and miscellaneous aspects
of the college's relationship with its sponsoring church;
(4) the place of religion in the college's program, which
includes the extent of religious manifestation in the
physical surroundings, the character and extent of religious observance sponsored or encouraged by the college,
the required participation for any or all students, the extent to which the college sponsors or encourages religious activity of sects different from that of the college's
own church and the place of religion in the curriculum
and in extra-curricular programs; (5) the result or "outcome" of the college program, such as accreditation and
the nature and character of the activities of the alumni;
and (6) the work and image of the college in the community.77
Aid to three of the four colleges evaluated in respect to the aforementioned factors would have violated the first amendment's religious clauses. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the opinion. The decision stood, but so did confusion over the judicial propriety of the standards. Many still
find the standards nebulous and impossible to use.78 Nonetheless,
both state and federal courts at all levels have since attempted
either to apply them, or those of their own making.
The Maryland court set an impressive precedent. Implications for church-related schools seem to suggest the more religious the college, the less public funds it should expect.79 This
consequence was pointed out by the court. Yet it underscored a
dilemma only now beginning to emerge. Parents and students
frequently choose a college because of its close ties to a particular religion. As the same college moves in the direction of secularity in quest of public funds, it simultaneously loses those supporters who seek its sectarianism. Thus, the very attraction used
as rationale for its existence-diversity-is abandoned. Still, preservation of diversity is perhaps the most fundamental claim for
public funding.
77.

Id. at 65-66.

78. Id.
79.

Evidence that colleges have heeded the message is plentiful. See

W. GELLHORN, THE SECTARIAN COLLEGE AND THE PUBLIC PURSE (1970).
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Trading Autonomy for Dollars
The theory of "governmental instrumentalism" imports that
whatever is financed by the government sooner or later becomes
its instrument. Perhaps a more fitting expression of the doctrine is that of the proverbial truth recently cited by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin: "He who pays the fiddler calls the tune.""0
The trick though, said the court, is to keep the payer from also
being the one who "furnishes the sheet music.""
That private educators would eschew public controls seems
axiomatic. Equally self-evident is the government's reluctance to
relinquish its citizens' money without direction over its use. Indeed, it is constitutionally powerless to do so. Until recently, evidence of governmental intrusion into the affairs of publiclyfinanced private institutions was lacking. Studies as late as 1970
disclosed no loss of private institutional autonomy. 2 Case law
on public involvement in various forms of private property offers
some indication as to at what point decisions of private administrators become state action, and therefore subject to the restrictions stated in the fourteenth amendment.8" The point for private
colleges is beginning to turn on the degree to which they are
publicly financed or otherwise entangled with the state.
The four member dissenting opinion in Tilton has sounded
the warning note:
Once these schools become federally funded they become
bound by federal standards. .

.

. That kind of surveil-

lance and control will certainly be obnoxious to the
church authorities and if done will radically change the
character of the parochial school."
leges in New York have fairly well financed a new science-that of reducing
religion in religious courses to "acceptable levels."

80. State ez rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 322, 198 N.W.
2d 650, 656 (1972).
81. Id.
82. E. Palola, A Challenge for Statewide Planners, 5 THE RESEARCH
REPORTER 3 (Berkeley Center for Research and Development in Higher Edu.
cation 1970).
83. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Central Hardware
Company v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
84. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693-94 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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In Tilton, the issue was religion. Fourteen years earlier the
issue was race, but the question was identical." At what point
does public involvement in a private college convert private discrimination to state action? The majority of the Court held that
although Gerald College was private (and totally privately financed), city administration of the school constituted state action
and brought the college under the fourteenth amendment."
In 1961, a federal court of appeals ruled that where a city
merely allowed a private university to use surplus city buildings
and land, the city's involvement constituted sufficient state action
to bring the fourteenth amendment into play."7 By 1968, another
court of appeals ruling extended fourteenth amendment due
process protection to students expelled from Alfred University,
a private institution. 8 The Dean of Student's decision expelling
the students for refusal to obey his instructions was state action,
in that the students were from the University's School of Ceramics which was financed by the state. Two years later (1971), a
New York Supreme Court, Tenth Judicial District, reinstated a
student expelled without due process by the Dean of Students at
Hofstra University.8 9 The rationale: public funding at Hofstra
had made the Dean's decision state action. For identical reasons,
a 1973 federal district court opinion restored two students to
Boston University's ice hockey team."' The students had been declared ineligible by the private school for their former "professional" activities. The last two cases are well worth further
scrutiny.
Ryan v. Hofstra University"'
Hofstra University considers itself a private institution. The
Dean of Students at Hofstra expelled "completely and permanently" a student for throwing rocks through windows of campus
facilities. Prior to expulsion, the student was given the type and
degree of administrative review deemed appropriate by Hofstra's
college officials. The court was asked to find Hofstra's actions
85. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trustees of the City of
Philadelphia, 343 U.S. 230 (1957).

86. Id.
87.
88.
89.

Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1961).
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
Ryan v. Hofstra University, 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.

Ct., Special Term 1971).

90.

Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 366 F. Supp. 1152

(D. Mass. 1973).

91.

67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1971).
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arbitrary in that they fell short of providing due process under
law as required by the fourteenth amendment and to reinstate
the student. Hofstra University maintained that the fourteenth
amendment protects individuals from state action; that Hofstra,
being a private institution, was not legally obliged to meet the
fourteenth amendment's due process standard. The court disagreed.
Normally, the court concluded, a citizen can compel a private organization to honor the terms of a contract. But when
terms between colleges and students are merely implied, such as
the implication that fundamental fairness will be followed in case
of disciplinary actions, enforcement is all but precluded. More to
the point, the Justices asked "in what pragmatic sense is Hofstra
'private'?"
To determine the answer to its question, the University was
measured by a dominance-of-support test, and by the degree to
which it was entwined with government policies and impregnated
with a governmental character. These were the findings:
1. Hofstra is franchised by the State, controlled in its
degree requirements by the State, and subject to State
visitation. [It] discharges a public function for the
State, as part of9 a2 State policy of mobilizing higher education resources.
2. The University is replete with public interest, requirement and supervision. The University is in the
most real comparable sense a public trust for the rendition of education. It is only for this reason that so much
public wealth and effort has been supplied to it.93
3. Financial support accrues to Hofstra in various ways:
government grants, and tuition scholarship awards go
into its operating budget; federal construction grants;
exemption from real estate tax status; operation of government programs on campus; benefits under the buildlease-and-reconvey arrangement of the New York Dormitory Authority ... [all inure to it].91
Regarding the aid mentioned in number three, the court observed
that because of this type of entanglement with the state, the Dor92. Id. at 669, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
93. Id. at 668, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
94. Id. at 667, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
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mitory Authority has the power to make and enforce rules regarding the use or misuse of its facilities. The rock-throwing
incident occurred on Dormitory Authority property. Measured by
these standards:
Hofstra students must receive equal protection of the
laws. This means that there can be no distinction of
legal treatment between Hofstra students themselves,
and that Hofstra students must get no less protection
of the laws than that the State affords students at other
schools of conceded state action, except by legislative
classification."
Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association9 6
Two students were declared ineligible to participate on their
college ice hockey team. The students had attended high school
in Canada. There, they had played for what amounted to a junior
professional team. They received no salary, but did accept reimbursement for personal expenses. United States high school students can accept the same reimbursements from their schools.
However, in Canada few schools can afford organized ice hockey
teams. Thus, if young men are to play, they must do so on one
of the "junior professional" teams. Yet, if and when they attend
American colleges, they run afoul of athletic association rules.
These regulations with their unequal effects on Canadian and
American boys, were the subject of this suit against the National
Collegiate Athletic Association and Boston University.
Boston University is a private school. This fact seemed to
make little difference to the court, however. A substantial amount
of precedent (including Ryan v. Hofstra University) compelled
the conclusion that "government financial support has been held
to bring a private beneficiary within the strictures of the 14th
Amendment."" Since Boston University had, in 1973 alone, received over 18 million dollars in public funds, and was accepting
additional funds at the time of the decision, it too was brought
"within the strictures of the 14th Amendment." The athletic rules
98
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Though none of the cases involved private administrative decisions on academic issues, Mr. Justice Douglas has recently said:
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 670, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1157.
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No more direct assault on academic freedom can be
imagined than for the school authorities to be allowed
to discharge a teacher because of his or her philosophical, political, or ideological beliefs. The same may well
be true of private schools also, if through the devise of
financing or other umbilical cords they become instrumentalities of the State.99
It would also be hard to imagine a deeper thrust at the autonomy
of a church-related college than a lessening of its control over
ideologies. 0 0 Any attempt by the state to ensure secular teaching would also be clearly subject to challenge on academic freedom grounds.
Subjecting schools to public standards and finding state action when private colleges are publicly financed, could create a
"parade of horribles." The American Association of State Colleges and Universities has resolved,
that any State providing funds to private colleges should
require "fiscal accountability to the State"; that funds
be allocated among public and private institutions "on
the basis of an agreed-upon standard for space utilization and faculty-student ratio"; and that to qualify for
State funds, all institutions be "subject to common standards" except for distinctions based on academic ability
and other "student factors." '
New legislation on the control of student records affects private college federal-aid-recipients with force equal to that at public schools. The so-called Buckley Amendment ' has widespread
regulating potential, and it provides for a cutoff of federal funds
for schools found in violation of the Act.
In sum, the use of public money to finance private colleges
has many potential effects. History admits no possibility that the
full range of those effects-National Labor Relations Board, Civil
Rights Act provisions, ad infinitum-will spare publicly financed
99. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
100. The theory of the governmental instrumentalism is developing on a
wide front, particularly in areas of quasi-public corporations, such as utilities.
See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
101. D. HALSTEAD, supra note 11.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1974).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss3/5

Smith: Emerging Consequences of Financing Private Colleges with Public M

1975]

EMERGING CONSEQUENCES

colleges. It is conceivable that statutes aiding church-related colleges might be structured to escape constitutional strictures. In
fact, a careful reading of the cases ought to provide a blueprint
of sorts. It is the emerging consequences that cannot possibly be
avoided. Church-related colleges might hope to gain public funds.
The price will be lessening of church affiliation and autonomy.
States may hope to gain education for their citizens at a cost
saving or to aid citizens in choice of schools. The trade-off will
be unwanted state involvement in private affairs and annual embroilments with public and private college competitors for more
tax dollars.
Consequences follow decisions. In the background the consequences frequently become overshadowed by the necessity and urgency of the action at hand. But they always come to the forefront eventually. Private, especially church-related colleges, and
states ought to focus now on the consequences.
THE COLLEGE-AID CASES

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
03
A. Tilton v. Richardson'
The issue in this case was the constitutionality of a federal
Act'"4 which provided colleges and universities loans of up to fiftypercent of the cost for constructing facilities. Recipients could be
public or private institutions. No facility financed under the Act
could be used for any religious purpose for a twenty year period.
Although striking down the twenty year limitation, the Court upheld the Act.
Four members of the Court agreed on the plurality opinion;"5 one agreed in the result,' 6 but issued a separate opinion;
four members dissented."" By this decision federal aid in the form
of construction grants to church-related colleges was sustained.
103.

403 U.S. 672 (1971).

104. Act of Dec. 16, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 101, 77 Stat. 364.
105. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart & Blackmun
constituted the plurality.
106. Significantly, the concurring justice along with the dissenting justices failed to see the distinction, though he would have upheld aid to all
levels of schools. 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
107. The dissenting justices could not reconcile the decision with the
Court's simultaneous rulings against statutes granting aid to lower level
church-related schools. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971)

las, J., dissenting).
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Excepting the twenty year limitation on religious activities,
the Act was declared valid primarily on the basis of numerous
distinctions drawn between education at higher and lower levels.
In the process, tests were used to assess the hazards of governmental sponsorship, or financial support of religion, or the active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. To be sustained, the Act had to reflect a secular legislative purpose, have
a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion,
avoid fostering excessive government entanglement with religion,
and exert no inhibition on the free exercise of religion by its
implementation.'"
The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 is grounded in
the National Defense Education Act of 1958."9 The latter, and
therefore this Act, was founded on the principle of defensesecurity and general welfare-"a secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental action.."..
Whether the primary effect advanced religion was answered
by examining the terms of the Act. Funds were expressly restricted to secular purposes at each recipient institution. The
proper use or misuse could only be evaluated by observing the
application of funds at individual schools. Consistency demanded
that a composite profile of typical sectarianism at all schools be
rejected. But, the Court added:
Individual projects can be properly evaluated if and
when challenges arise with respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented to show that
the institution does in fact possess these characteristics.11 '
By "these characteristics," the Court meant a relationship
between the school and its affiliated religion close enough to foster an excessive entanglement between the aid-recipient and the
government agency administering the Act. Regarding the schools
in question, several factors were noted:
All were colleges, with students "less impressionable and
less susceptible to religious indoctrination.""' 2
All admitted students and faculty of various religious faiths. None required attendance at religious serv108. Id. at 678.
109. 20 U.S.C. §§401-602 (1974).
110.

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).

111. Id. at 682.
112. Id. at 686.
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ices. Each did require courses in theology, but the courses
followed principles of academic freedom. And no school
attempted to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. '"
Thus, (1) consideration of the character of the institutions together with (2) the nonideological nature of the aid, and (3) the
one-time, single-purpose, limited-contact structure of the Act,
cumulatively "shape a narrow and limited relationship with government which involves fewer and less significant contacts than
the two state schemes before us in Lemon and DiCenso.""4 Possibly, the Court surmised, the same reasons accounted for the
lack of political division along religious lines. At any rate, no one
had documented "any continuing religious aggravation on this
matter in the political process.""' Free exercise claims were discounted in the absence of any identifiable "coercion directed at
the practice or exercise of their (appellants) religious beliefs.""'
The dissenting opinion, in which four justices joined, was
written by Justice Douglas. Dissatisfaction with apparent inconsistencies between the Court's earlier and present decisions is
evident in the following passage:
The majority's distinction is in effect that small violations of the First Amendment over a period of years are
unconstitutional (see Lemon and DiCenso) while a huge
violation occurring only once is de minimus. I cannot
agree with such sophistry."'
The dissent went on to suggest that something ominous lurks
within the majority's opinion, something that will eventually affect the character and academic freedom of church-related colleges. "Once these schools become federally funded they become
bound by federal standards.... "18
B.

Hunt v. McNair"9

South Carolina's Act authorizing an Educational Facilities
Authority to issue bonds to assist colleges in construction projects
113. Id. at 686-87.
114. Id. at 688.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aid to
lower level church-related schools failed to win the Court's approval for essentially the same reasons the aid here passed.
115. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
116. Id. at 689.
117. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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was. challenged.' 20 Advantages accrue to recipient colleges since
interest paid to bondholders on obligations of state is not subject
Bonds can be sold at lower
to state or federal income taxes.'
than conventional rates of interest to a ready market. No state
revenues are involved in cancellation of either principal or interest, nor are any expenses incurred in marketing the bonds. In
operation, the Authority retains title to any project financed by
bond proceeds; a college-recipient leases the project until repayment is complete, whereupon the Authority reconveys the project
title to the college. The recipient in Hunt was a church-related
college.
The Court's decision which was divided six to three, upheld
this form of state aid to church-affiliated colleges.' 2 Standards
used to measure the Tilton case-purpose, effect, and entanglement-were also used here. In finding the purpose secular, it
was noted that benefits of the Act are available to all colleges,
public and private.
As to the primary effect, not unlike Tilton, the Act placed
restrictions upon conducting religious activities in projects so
funded. In addition, the Authority could inspect individual schools
to ensure adherence to the restrictions-both prior to and after
reconveyance of the project title. Again, there was an absence of
evidence closely linking the particular school to its affiliated
church. The Court quoted from Tilton: "Individual projects can
be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with respect
As a guide to such individual
."
to particular recipients .
evaluation, the following remarks were offered:
Aid normally may- be thought to have a primary effect
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-41 (Supp. 1973).
121. South Carolina's statute expressly states that the bonds can in
no way, directly or indirectly, be considered an obligation of the state. The
income from the bonds nevertheless qualifies for tax exemption, despite the
fact that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1) (1967),
limits interest income which is not considered gross income for federal tax
purposes to interest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing . . .
(emphasis added).
122. Dissenting Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, it should
be recognized, also dissented in Tilton. Justice Black, the other dissenter in
Tilton, died prior to the decision of Hunt.
123. 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973), quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 682 (1971).
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which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission
or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an
2"
otherwise substantially secular setting.'
But "appellant has introduced no evidence in the present case
placing the College in such a category."'.

Such evidence, if offered and found insufficient to demonstrate the college's primary purpose as that of advancing religion,
would not necessarily meet the excessive entanglement test. That
standard might fail on the basis of state regulations for administering the Act. South Carolina's regulations were "sweeping
ones, and were there a realistic likelihood that they would be
exercised in their full detail, the entanglement problems with the
proposed transaction would not be insignificant."' 26 The Authority was even empowered to set rules governing charges and fees
made by a college, in order to ensure repayment of bonds, should
a college default.'27 This power, if exercised, might be inconsistent with the establishment clause, the majority said, "but we do
28
not now have that situation before us.'
The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan, recognized a distinction between Tilton and Hunt. In Tilton, the
majority found "no significant intrusions into the everyday affairs of sectarian educational institutions."' 29 However, "under
the South Carolina scheme, 'continuing financial relationships or
dependencies,' 'annual audits,' 'government analysis,' and 'regulation and surveillance' are the core features of the arrangement."'"0
124. 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 747.
127. The Authority is empowered by the Act:
(g) generally, to fix and revise from time to time and charge and
collect rates, rents, fees and charges for the use of and for the services
furnished or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof and
to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation
or other body public or private in respect thereof; (h) to establish
rules and regulations for the use of a project or any portion thereof
and to designate a participating institution for higher education
as its agent to establish rules and regulations for the use of a project
undertaken for such participating institution for higher education ...
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-41.4 (Supp. 1973).
128. 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973).
129. Id. at 753-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The conclusion is compelled that this involves the State
in the "essentially religious activities of religious institutions" and "employs the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes.''.
The Supreme Court's rulings in favor of a very limited form
of noncontinuous federal aid, and an even more severely restricted
type of state aid to church-related colleges, is conservative by any
standard. The effects have been predictively cataclysmic. Besides
stimulating additional state legislation in aid of private colleges,
the Court's decisions have encouraged careful judicial review of
state laws under the religious clauses of the first amendment.
Post-Tilton Federal and State Supreme Court Decisions
State courts have the responsibility of reviewing legislation
under federal as well as state law. A court may uphold or strike
down a legislative act under its own state constitution unless the
subject of the act is proscribed or guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. Similarly, an act might be prohibited by a state
constitution, even though allowable (assuming it is not guaranteed) under the United States Constitution. But a state may
never permit continuation of an act which, though valid under
state law, contradicts the United States Constitution. Clear standards or so-called "tests" for deciding the federal constitutionality of state aid to private, church-related colleges emerged only
with the United States Supreme Court's rulings.'32 Implementation of those guidelines has created a paramount distinction between pre- and post-1971 state court decisions.
The Federal Decisions
A. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Bubb. "3
Kansas law provides students enrolled in private institutions
with tuition grants.'3 " In operation, individual students are notified that an amount has been awarded in their name, but payment is made to the private college in which a student is enrolled.' 5
131. Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. The United States Supreme Court will decide next term the constitutionality of Tennessee's Tuition Grant Act. Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974),
prob. juris. noted, 95 S.Ct. 1114 (1975). That Act was found unconstitutional

at the district court level.
133.
134.

135.

379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6107 (1972).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6110 (1972).
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The college is required by the Act to be private, to be accredited
by a regional association, and to admit students without regard for
race, sex, religion, creed or national origin.
At the time of the suit all colleges involved (nineteen) were
church-related. The Act was challenged on the fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds, and under the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
Those who challenged the Act argued that since private college
students alone could benefit, public college students were not afforded equal treatment. Private students presumably choose their
school for the advantage it offers over public schools, and thus
the state subsidizes that advantage. The court held that the student enrolled in a public institution already receives state aid
in the form of his largely publicly-financed education.136 Assuming
arguendo that unequal treatment did exist, the court reviewed the
Act by the loose standard: so long as the state's objectives in establishing the Act are legitimate, its policies-if they are reasonably
related to the objective-will be in harmony with the fourteenth
amendment." 7
Turning to the establishment clause challenge, the Act was
found to have a secular purpose. The officially stated purposes
were to save the state money by using facilities and faculties of
private colleges, and to offer students assistance needed to attend
colleges of their choice.3 8
The primary effect of the Act was evaluated for each college
separately by scrutinizing the nature of the individual institution.
Eight standards were used to measure the religious entanglement
of the schools.' 9
1.

Religious restrictions on student admission-Though
all had religiously homogeneous student bodies, no
restrictive polices were evident, and only one college

136. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Bubb,
379 F. Supp. 872, 885 (D. Kan. 1974).
137. Id. at 885-86.
138. A note of interest is that reasons for the Act were recorded, one
of which was to reduce the number of students who are forced to choose
public over private colleges because of intolerable tuition increases in private
schools. Yet, oddly, evidence was offered by the defendants to show that of
500 student-aid-recipients questioned, 250 said that without tuition grants they
would not have chosen to attend any Kansas college. Alternatives of the other
respondents were not mentioned.

139.

Id. at 892-93.
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gave preference to applicants of a particular religion.
However, all applicants were required to submit a
pastor's evaluation of themselves. This factor, coupled with the homogeneous nature of the institution
made the college ineligible.
2.

Explicitly or implicitly required attendance of students at religious activities-Three colleges were
excluded on this ground. None of the three explicitly
required attendance, rather, students were pressured
in various subtle ways to attend religious functions.

3.

Required obedience by students to specific doctrines
or dogmas--One college failed this test. It required
oral examinations in which a student's spiritual development and philosophy could be explored.

4.

Required attendance in theological or sectarian
courses-All colleges required attendance in religious
courses, but the court found the courses objective and
neutral.

5.

Degree to which the colleges were a part of their
respective sponsoring denomination-All colleges had
religious reasons for their existence, but none attempted to proselytize or inculcate students with
their faith.

6.

Extent to which the colleges sought to indoctrinate
students with their religious values-No college was
held to have an interest in inculcation as a substantial
purpose.

7.

Imposition of religious restrictions on faculty appointments-Though all colleges had religiously homogeneous faculties, no restrictive hiring policies
were evident.

8.

Religious restrictions on what or how the faculties
taught-All colleges followed accepted standards of
academic freedom.

The court noted that the five colleges barred from participation
could again become eligible by eliminating their particular infirmities.
Consideration was next given to the possibility of excessive
entanglement of church and state--entanglement resulting from
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss3/5
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surveillance and from political discord.1"' Because the Act granted
tuition directly to students for secular education, the Bubb court
saw little risk of administrative entanglements. Further, the
statute did not require surveillance as it did not specify or limit
usage of funds in the accounts of colleges. The diversity of
students and faiths represented on all campuses were credited
as factors likely to lessen political dissention for religious aid.
Finally, the court could find no basis for a free exercise
challenge.1"' Simply being a taxpayer is not enough, the court
noted; one must show "the coercive effect of the enactment as
it operates against him in the practice of his religion."' 42
B.

Roemer v. Board of Public Works of the State of Maryland' 3

Maryland provides eligible private colleges with government
grants-unspecified as to purpose.'
Institutions which award
only theological degrees are ineligible. A further restriction is
that no moneys paid under the Act are to be used for sectarian
purposes. Formulas for allocating aid have been revised almost
annually, and "each change in the statutory formula has resulted
in a significant increase in public aid to the recipient institutions."' 4 Since five of the recipients were church-related colleges,
the Act was challenged under the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
A three-judge panel upheld the statute by a 2-1 decision,
Senior Circuit Judge Bryan dissenting. Since then, the case has
been appealed.'" The decision was based solely upon the court's
own findings of fact, which are part of the opinion. Among the
findings were these:
1.

Each college afforded its faculty a high degree of
academic freedom.

2.

All of the defendent colleges, except one, followed, to

140. Id. at 894.
141. Id. at 895.
142. Id.
143. 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974).
144. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77A, § 65 (Supp. 1971).
145. Roemer v. Board of Public Works of the State of Maryland, 387
F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D. Md. 1974).
146. It may be worth noting that two of the recipients were earlier
involved in a case where they were declared by a Maryland court of appeals
to be "sectarian" and aid to them violative of the first amendment. Horace
Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).
See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
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various degrees, the practice of opening classes with
prayer.
3.

To some extent, each college examined---except oneconsidered religion in hiring faculty members. However, the court found no complaints from any faculty
indicating an attempt by administrators "to stack its
faculty with members of a particular faith.""'4

4.

All colleges had "vigorous" theology departments,
staffed chiefly or totally with clerics of their affiliated church. Students were required to take courses
in theology. Although principles of academic freedom guided the courses, the court cautioned that one
ought not conclude that 148
the courses "have no overtones of indoctrination."

5.

With the exception of one college, all had religiously
based quotas for membership on their governing
boards.

6.

The majority religion of students at each school was
compatible with that of the affiliated church, though
admission was not restricted by religion.

7.

No follow-up policy existed to ensure that past or
contemporary grants were not later diverted to sectarian uses.

8.

Each college had a voluntary chaplain program with
each chaplain a member of the affiliated church.

9.

Each defendant college had as a secondary objective
the encouragement of spiritual development with its
students.' "

The decision was derived by looking at the court's findings of
facts in light of the United States Supreme Court's three-pronged
test: a secular legislative purpose, a neutral primary effect, and
a relationship between church and state that does not foster
In Tilton, aid in the form of one-time
excessive entanglement.'
147.
F. Supp.
148.
149.
150.

Roemer v. Board of Public Works of the State of Maryland, 387
1282, 1293 (D. Md. 1974).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1286.
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construction grants to church-related colleges had passed the test.
Maryland's continuous, non-categorial grants were likened to
Tilton throughout the decision.
Except for the use of funds for theological courses, the Act
passed each part of the test. The legislative purpose was found
secular. The Act was a legitimate effort to Save tax money. The
primary effect was neutral in that each school was seen as performing an essentially secular educational function, no school
required attendance at religious services, each school had hired
faculty who were not members of the affiliated church, and the
"atmosphere of academic freedom prevailed on each campus......
Academic freedom and the essentially secular functions of the
colleges were also cited as primary factors reducing the risk of
excessive entanglement. Additional determinants here included
the Act's exemption of strictly theological schools and prohibition
against use of funds for sectarian purposes. The president of
each college was required to verify biannually that the terms
of the Act had been adhered to.
It should be noted that the court recognized two significant
differences between its case and Tilton. In Tilton, buildings for
secular use were at issue. Here, funds could be used for teaching
salaries. The court stated "clearly the distinction does not rise
to constitutional dimensions."'5 2 Academic freedom could be relied
upon to monitor teaching, making state surveillance unnecessary.
And in Tilton, the funds were not of an ongoing nature. The
Maryland Act called for "annual appropriations, and the recipient schools are likely to request additional aid.""' But the
judges added, "Political conflict over the size of allocations or the
scope of programs in Maryland are not likely to involve the
affiliated churches to a major degree in the political controversy." "
The dissenting judge disagreed with his two colleagues, finding that "the Act in these instances does in truth offend the Constitution. .

. ."'I'

Also guided by Tilton, he noted the Supreme

Court's disapproval of a rule banning sectarian activity in publicly
financed buildings for only 20 years (as opposed to the life of
the building). "This decision," said Judge Bryan, "trenchantly
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1291.
Id.

155.

Id. at 1298 (emphasis in original).
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confirms that possible utilization of public property in advancing
religion is ipso facto inhibited."' 15 6 The potential misuse of moneys,
the reasonable opportunity for sectarian misapplication, became
the judge's test.
He characterized the Act before him as a "blunderbuss
discharge of public funds to a church-affiliated or church-related
college."'' However, the fact that nothing in the Act or the majority's decision prohibits the colleges from hiring chaplains with
the state's money bolstered his observations. The dissenter concluded, "research discloses to me no comparable carte blanche power
of expenditure permissibly conferred by a State upon church-affiliated or church-related institutions."' 5 8
C.

Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State v. Dunn'"

Tennessee's Tuition Grant Program ' was found to violate
the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Act purported
to provide state funds to students enrolled in either public or
private schools in order to foster free choices between private and
public colleges. In reality, the schools received the money. Eightyfive percent of funds disbursed to private schools went to churchrelated colleges.
The district court began by noting the Supreme Court's discussion of the main concerns which the establishment clause protects against: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."''
Then it recognized
the three-pronged test which has emerged from the Supreme
Court's decisions: a secular legislative purpose, a neutral primary effect, and absence of excessive entanglement of church and
state.'62 But at this point, it distinguished the case before it by
two factors: (1) the Supreme Court has never heard a case involving unrestricted funds to a church-related college,'
and (2) the
defendants had tried to bend the Court's tests to fit the needs of
156. Id. at 1299.
157. Id.

158. Id.
159. 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
160.

Ch. 265, §§ 1-9, 1971 Tenn. Acts (repealed 1974).

161.

Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Dunn,

384 F. Supp. 714, 719 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), quoting Walz v. Tax Commission,

397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
162.

Id. at 719. See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.

163.

Id.
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their cause, notwithstanding the differences.
165
words, they had "obfuscated" the issue.

Or, in the court's

To determine the Act's legality, other tests were needed. First
examined and applied as a test was aid allowed by the Supreme
Court to students (as opposed to schools). 8 All forms of such
benefits have been strictly limited in various ways. The Court
has said that neither unrestricted tuition reimbursements, or tax
deductions may be used as a reward or incentive for choosing a
private school. Child benefit acts, properly restricted, only incidentally benefit religions: they are not even forms of aid as determined by the first amendment according to the Dunn court.""
Tennessee's Act failed this standard, as the grants to students
68
were without restrictions.'
The second type of aid which had been upheld by the Supreme
Court and could thus be used as a guideline is aid to schools for
secular (as opposed to sectarian) functions.'16 All forms of aid
at all school levels, elementary through college, have been restricted to secular uses. Tennessee's Act did not limit colleges' use
of the funds; thus, there was no occasion for determining the law's
legality according to its application.
But it was because of the statute's lack of restrictions that
it failed the third hurdle, the possibility of excessive entanglement. "' Colleges were totally free to use their states' funds for
any purpose, religious included. Again, Dunn was distinguished
from those cases reviewed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, this
distinguishing factor, the lack of restriction to secular use, obviated the need to examine individual schools to ensure that purpose. Alternatively, it legitimized claims based on the overall profile of the church-related schools.
Evidence suggested that the degree of religious activity in
the church-related colleges was "something more than formal denominational control and something less than permeation of re7
ligious indoctrination."'
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 719-20.
167. Id. at 720.
168. In this context, and particularly where the students did not receive
the money anyway, it is difficult to conceive of how the statute might have
been restructured.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 721.
171. Id. at 721 n.8.
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Given the presence of such activity at certain of the eligible schools and the absence of restrictions in the statute,

the only conclusions are that the statute permits the use
of State funds for religious activity and therefore, that
the statute is unconstitutional as violative 2of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment'7
The State Supreme Court Decisions
A.

Iona College v. Nyquist"'3

New York's Education Laws' allows public moneys to be
paid to private, including church-related, but excluding sectarian,
institutions. The Commissioner of Education determines eligibility
and a college is ineligible if aid would be violative of either the
first amendment, or New York's Constitution. The Blaine Amendment to the New York Constitution reads:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use
its property or credit or any public money, or authorize
or permit either to be used directly or indirectly in aid
or maintenance ...

of any school or institution of learn-

ing wholly or in part under the control or direction of
any religious denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.'75
One method used by the Commissioner in his determination
is a questionnaire, completed and returned by the applicant institution. In the case of Iona, the college was found ineligible in
that: (1) it characterized itself as a "Catholic Institution";
(2) the catalog and other publications of the institution evidenced "a strong religious commitment"; (3) members of the
Board of Trustees, the president, and a significant number of
other administrators were of the sponsoring religious order; and
(4) the student handbook reflected an activity program "resting
on a philosophy which is 'Christian in inspiration."" 7 ' The Commissioner's findings were upheld by the court.

172.
173.
case, but
174.
175.
176.
144 n.1.

Id. at 721.
65 Misc. 2d 329, 316 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1970). This is a pre-Tilton
is presented as a contrast to other similar New York cases.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6401 (McKinney 1972).
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
Iona College v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 2d 329, 334 n.1. 316 N.Y.S.2d 139.
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7
Canisius College v. Nyquist'"

The same statute and state constitutional provision were
scrutinized in the instant case and in Iona College.'"' In finding
Canisius College ineligible for funds under the Act, the Commissioner pointed to facts which collectively conveyed to him his
understanding of the college as a whole:
I have noted that the College states, in its current catalog, that "The Commitment of Canisius College to the
pursuit of wisdom involves finally strong religious convictions, a dedication to Christ and His teachings"; five
of the twelve trustees, the president of the College, onethird of the administrative officers and twenty percent
of the faculty are members of the sponsoring religious
order; all students who profess adherence to the Roman
Catholic faith are required to complete twelve credit
hours in courses in religious studies; college-sponsored religious services are exclusively Roman Catholic in style,
all college chaplains are members of the sponsoring religious order, and the two religious organizations on campus are Roman Catholic related. 7"
Notwithstanding, the Commissioner based his decision on the
narrow phrase proscribing aid to institutions "in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.""..° That limited question was reviewed by a state supreme court (third district), and
the majority found the Commissioner's decision arbitrary and
capricious."'
The court refused to literally interpret the phrase "any . . .
institution . . . in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught.""..2 Rather, the reasonable interpretation, the court said,
would be that aid should not be granted to institutions teaching
particulartenets and doctrines to the exclusion of others. In its
interpretation, the court's decision was founded upon the variety
in course offerings and in denominational backgrounds of the
177. 36 App. Div. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1971). This case was
decided after Tilton was argued, but prior to the actual decision.
178. See notes 174, 175 supra.
179. Canisius College v. Nyquist, 36 App. Div. 2d 340, 342, 320 N.Y.S.2d
652, 654 (1971).
180. Id. at 343, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
181. Id. The "control" provision of the Blaine amendment was not
raised by the Commissioner or the court.
182. Id. at 344, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
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faculty, and upon the academic freedom allowed the faculty in
their teaching.'
Finally, the court noted the secular purpose and neutral
effect of the New York Act. It compared the law with forms of
aid previously allowed by the United States Supreme Court, and
found it consistent with the first amendment. ""
C.

College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist"5

This case is similar to the preceding New York cases with
respect to the central issue, but is distinguished in that it was
rendered after the Tilton decision.
The Commissioner had found the college ineligible for funds
under the state's constitution (as in Canisius), but not on the
basis of either of the passages of the Blaine Amendment. Rather,
he found it violative of both passages, according to his "understanding of the institution as a whole.""' 6
The court began by considering the second clause, which included any school or institution "in which any denominational
tenet or doctrine is taught.""" The decision in Canisius was
quoted."' Like Canisius, and for identical reasons, New Rochelle
College was held not to teach particular doctrines to the exclusion of all others." 9
Having passed muster under the second clause, consideration
turned to the clause which stated no aid can be allowed to "any
school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination." Again, the court
chose a non-literal interpretation of the constitution. Agreeing
that the college was denominationally sponsored, it nonetheless
refused to equate that with control and direction. To do so, it
said, would require a simplistic type of reasoning, long rejected. 9 "
The question upon which the court decided the issue was
whether the college was managed by a denomination in such a
manner as to inculcate its own brand of faith. The manner of
183.

Id. at 343, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 655.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 345-46, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
37 App. Div. 2d 461, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1971).
Id. at 464, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
Id.
Id. at 466, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
Id.
Id. at 467, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
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sponsorship determined control or direction. ' Following an analysis of the record, "considering the totality of the circumstances,"
New Rochelle College was held to pass the test.'92
On the strength of its opinion relative to state law, the court
quickly found the Act constitutional, that is, secular in its purpose and effect, under federal law. The question of excessive entanglement (then recently raised by the United States Supreme
Court in Tilton) was also successfully resolved, but with greater
difficulty. Under that test, the Supreme Court had struck down
forms of unrestricted aid to elementary and secondary parochial
schools, but supported a form of limited aid to private colleges
and universities. The New York court seemed to position its case
somewhere in between:
Although there are factors in Tilton which distinguish
it from the present case (e.g., we do not here have a
one-time, single purpose grant), there are fewer and
less significant entanglements between religion and government present here than were present in Lemon and
DiCenso.'93
D. Hartness v. Paterson'"
South Carolina's program of tuition grants' 5 to students of
private colleges, except those taking degrees in theology, divinity
or religious education, was declared in violation of the state's
constitution. South Carolina's Constitution provides that:
the property or credit of the State of South Carolina .
or any public money, from whatever source derived,
shall not . . . be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance of any college . . . which is wholly or in
part under the direction or control of any church or religious or sectarian denomination, society or organization.'9 6
The court rejected arguments that the grants only pay for
part of the tuition cost, since if part of the payment of tuition
191. Id. at 468, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 471, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 775. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
603 (1971).
194. 255 S.C. 503, 179 S.E.2d 907 (1971). This case was decided after
Tilton was argued, but before it was decided.
195. Act No. 1191, 1970 Acts of the General Assembly, 56 S.C. Stat. 2579.
196. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 9.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 5

602

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

by such grants were legal, "all could just as legally be paid, resulting in the support of such institutions entirely with State
funds."' 7 Also rejected was the notion that grants to students,
where restricted to use by schools, are not grants to the schools.
The court concluded that under South Carolina's Constitution,
indirect aid was as unconstitutional as direct aid.'98
E.

Clayton v. Kerrick9"

This New Jersey case involved an Act °0 authorizing a state
authority to sell bonds to provide funds for construction of facilities at public and private colleges. It was upheld under the Federal Constitution after the Tilton decision (but prior to Hunt, the
object of a similar act), and on appeal the United States Supreme Court vacated the state court's ruling and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of Tilton.
Upon reconsideration, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
its earlier decision. The basis for its decision was that unlike the
grants involved in Tilton, only loans were involved in the instant
case."° ' The loans were self-sustaining (no tax money was involved), and the state was not obligated for repayment. Further,
public and private institutions were eligible. No private institution could use funds for facilities to be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. And any facility built with the funds
could never be used for religious purposes.
The court likened the inexpensive loans to other services rendered at a savings by the state, such as water and electricity-in
which a degree of contractual or financial entanglement exists.
Nothing, the court thought, in the first amendment requires states
to refuse such services to otherwise indistinguishable sectarian
institutions.2 2 In addition, nothing in the record could convince
the court that the institutions were too religiously dominated.
F.

State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum °3

Wisconsin law 0 ' authorized the state to contract with churchrelated Marquette University to provide citizens with dental edu197.
198.
199.

Hartness v. Patterson, 255 S.C. 503, 505, 179 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1971).
Id. at 504, 179 S.E.2d at 908.
59 N.J. 583, 285 A.2d 11 (1971).

200.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 72A-1 (1968).

201.
202.
203.
204.

Clayton v. Kerrick, 59 N.J. 583, 589, 285 A.2d 11, 17 (1971).
Id. at 585, 285 A.2d at 13.
55 Wis. 2d 316, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972).
Law of June 6, 1971, ch. 44, § 4, 1971 Wis. Laws (repealed 1973).
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cation. Marquette has the state's only school of dentistry. The
law provided an amount of money for each student enrolled. Use
of the funds was not restricted to the dental school, but could be
applied to operating expenses of the University as a whole, and
this was the facet of the Act challenged under the state's constitution, which reads:
The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never
be infringed . . . nor shall any money be drawn from
the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious theological seminaries25
Wisconsin's Supreme Court, however, observed that the Act
could not stand even if it were valid under the state's constitution if it violated the Federal Constitution. Thus it reviewed the
latter question first. As to the "secular legislative purpose" standard, the court could find no "Catholic way to pull a tooth." '0°
Regarding "excessive entanglement," nothing about the state's interest in secular dental education called for surveillance, which
the court defined as the instrument of entanglement."" The decision did indicate, though, that the justices would have preferred
that the statute provide that no courses in religion ever be required of dental students.2 8
The Act failed in two respects. It had the primary effect of
advancing religion in that money was not restricted to the secular school of dentistry. But the most serious defect was the Act's
primary effect on the free exercise clause. Not only did the
statute require the dental school to conform to accepted academic
and professional standards, and to give preference in its admission policies to in-state applicants, but it barred the University
as a whole from discriminating among employees and students
20 9
on the basis of sex, race, religion, color, or national origin.
Under those standards, the court said that the University
might be obligated to "open the opportunity to be university pres205. Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18. The court did not touch on the possibility
of the University shifting funds normally used in dentistry to other religious
purposes. That did not trouble it. Rather, it sought to ensure that the state

did not assist in this end by failing to restrict funds to the secular school
of dentistry.
206. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 320, 198 N.W.2d
650, 654 (1972).

207. Id. at 323, 198 N.W.2d at 657.
208. Id. at 324, 198 N.W.2d at 658.
209. Id. at 322, 198 N.W.2d at 656.
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ident to others than members of the Jesuit Order.

210

(Vol. 9
A proverb

was quoted, "He who pays the fiddler calls the tune."2 ' But, the
majority cautioned,
In this sensitive area, it cannot be permitted to develop that, "He who pays the fiddler furnishes the sheet
music," at least not beyond the specific and limited area
involved in the contract. Guidelines and standards too
easily become halter and harness.2 '
G.

2
Durham v. McLeod 1

3

An Act providing loans to college students was upheld by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, both as to Article XI, section 9
of the South Carolina Constitution, and the United States Constitution.2 Funds for the loans came from grants to the administering loan authority, federal sources, earnings by the authority,
and from loan repayments. No tax money was involved, nor was
the state obligated for repayment.
Loans were made to residents of South Carolina desiring
higher education. The education could be of any type, at any
college-public or private, and in the state or out. The court likened
the loan to that which can be secured at the local bank. It noted
that the state is not required to deliberately place church-related
schools at a disadvantage by making them ineligible to compete
for loan funds.1 5
H.

2
Weiss v. O'Brien

6

Washington's College Tuition Supplement Program 2'7 was declared to violate both the Washington and United States Constitutions. The Washington Constitution states: "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall
be forever free from sectarian control or influence. ' 18
The court first found the Act to support, in part, the schools
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.

213.

259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972).

214. Act of June 15, 1971, 57 S.C. Stat. 775, was the statute involved.
For relevant provisions of the state constitution, see note 196 supra and accompanying text.
215. Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 411, 192 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1972).
216. 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973).
217. Ch. 155, § 10, [1972] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 494.
218. WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
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for which it was intended.2"' The Act limited funds to nonpublic
students. Students signed application cards, ensuring their eligibility and assigning their grants to their college. A collective
voucher, equal to the sum of the students' grants, was sent to
each participating college.
Next, the court found the schools to be sectarian, thus violative of the state constitution. " ' Each school was analyzed for
evidence of sectarianism. All varied in degree, but each evidenced
a religious character which is represented in these illustrative
findings:
Manner of governance--statements restricting governing board actions to doctrines and standards consistent
with the affiliated church ;221
Faculty-high degrees of academic freedom, but caveats
to faculty members about maintaining standards of life
and conduct consistent with the philosophy and objectives of the institution ;222
Budget-minimal direct church support (an average of
less than 12 percent), but much voluntary service from
members of affiliated churches ;223
Religion in the Curriculum-requirements of one or more
courses in religion for a bachelor's degree; majors in preChristian education.'
As to the first amendment, the Act failed the entanglement
test-but not on administrative grounds, since "[t]he council
makes no audit to insure that the funds will be used for nonreligious purposes, not to see that the disbursement is actually
applied to students' tuition." 2' Rather, political entanglements
were seen as intrinsic in the plan. "Greater and greater appropriations are likely each year, thus splitting the candidates and
the electorate along religious lines. 2 2 6
7
I. Miller v. AyerThe revised constitution of Virginia permits (1) unrestricted
219. Weiss v. O'Brien, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 204, 509 P.2d 973, 978 (1973).
220. Id. at 206-07, 509 P.2d at 980-81.
221. Id. at 214, 509 P.2d at 988.
222. Id. at 215, 509 P.2d at 989.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 217, 509 P.2d at 991.
226. Id.
227. 214 Va. 171, 198 S.E.2d 634 (1973).
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public aid to nonsectarian private schools, and (2) loans (repayable in money or service to the state) to church-related colleges
whose primary purpose is not religious training or theological
education.
The General Assembly may appropriate funds for educational purposes which may be expended in furtherance
of elementary, secondary, collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students in public and nonsectarian private schools and institutions of learning ...
"'
The General Assembly may provide for loans to students attending nonprofit institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth whose primary purpose is to
provide collegiate or graduate education and not to provide religious training or theological education."'
Also permitted for church-related colleges is aid in borrowing
money for construction of college facilities.
Virginia's Tuition Assistance Loan Act 30 had previously allowed repayment (by student recipients at church-related colleges) to be effected by money or satisfactory yearly academic
progress. That amounted to grants, however, and was found to
run afoul of the Virginia Constitution in an earlier case.2 3 ' That
same decision upheld the Act under the Federal Constitution.
A revised Act,2" the object of this case, made repayment
possible in several ways. The first monetary alternative was required residence in Virginia plus service to the state. The other
choices amounted to mere residence in the state. The court limited repayment alternatives for church-related college students to
money or service to the state.
The earlier decision, respecting the Act's legality under the
Federal Constitution, was reviewed in light of the principles of
Tilton and Hunt. Again it was upheld. Two factors were especially useful: (1) the secular atmosphere of the colleges, as opposed to elementary and secondary church-related schools,"' and
(2) failure of the record to show that Virginia's church-related

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11.
Ch. 18-19, [1972] Va. Acts (repealed 1973).
Miller v. Ayers, 213 Va. 149, 191 S.E.2d 261 (1972).
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-38.12 (Supp. 1974).
Miller v. Ayers, 214 Va. 171, 180, 198 S.E.2d 634, 643 (1973).
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college recipients were any more religiously oriented than those
of Tilton or Hunt.2 "
J.

Opinion of the Justices2 .

In response to a request for an advisory opinion, submitted
by the Alabama legislature, that state's supreme court held that
an unrestricted tuition grant plan would violate the state and
Federal Constitutions. The plan would have released funds to all
college students, but the decision revolved around student recipients at church-related colleges.2 '
The state's constitution says: "No money raised for the support of the public schools shall be appropriated to or used for
the support of any sectarian or denominational school.' '3 7
The court said:
[T] he cumulative impact of the relationship between the
State and church related institutions which is provided
for in H.B. 247, involves "an excessive entanglement"
between the State and religion and would therefore be
unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as well as its
Alabama counterpart, Article 14, Section 263.23'
K.

State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson?9

Tuition grants to students of private colleges were declared,
by a majority (5-2 decision) of Nebraska's Supreme Court, to violate the state and Federal Constitutions.
The majority quoted the provisions of the state constitution
it thought pertinent, including:
The Legislature shall not pass . . . special laws . . .
granting to any corporation, association, or individual
any special or exclusive privileges; immunity, or franchise . . . where a general law can be made applicable.
240
The state Legislature shall not make any appropriation
234. Id. at 179, 198 S.E.2d at 642.
235. 291 Ala. 301, 280 So. 2d 547 (1973).
236. Id. at 306, 280 So. 2d at 552.
237. ALA. CONST. art. 14, § 263.
238. Opinion of the Justices, 291 Ala. 301, 307, 280 So. 2d 547, 553 (1973).
239. 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
240. NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 18.
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from any public fund . . . in aid of any sectarian or denominational school or college, or any educational institution which is not exclusively owned and controlled by
the state.""
According to the Act""2 itself, the legislative intent was to
relieve the strain on public colleges and to aid students in freely
choosing qualified institutions of higher learning.2 " The Act was
declared inconsistent with state law because it limited benefits to
students choosing only academic higher education, within strictly
private institutions, and within the state. A natural class of citizens (students) was split in order to arbitrarily direct benefits
at a special group.2 "
Also noted was the Act's lack of restrictions. Funds could be
used for religious purposes, so the Act breached federal law, as
well.
There is no restriction in the act that the proceeds received through these grants be limited to secular subjects,
so obviously in some institutions these tuition grants
finance sectarian subjects. This alone shows secular and
sectarian subjects are so intertwined in and supported by
the tuition grants that L.B. 1171 violates the Establishment Clause. " 5
L.

CaliforniaEducationFacilities Authority v. Priest...

The California Supreme Court held that an Act providing
for the issuance of revenue bonds, and the use of the proceeds
therefrom to aid in the construction or rehabilitation of educational facilities at private colleges and universities, violated neither
the Federal nor California Constitution.
Synopsis of the Forms of Aid
The decisions on college aid since and including Tilton involve six forms of aid to private colleges: assistance in selling
bonds, student loans, contracts for special educational services,
grants restricted to construction purposes, grants unrestricted in
nature, and tuition grants. It would be helpful to categorize the
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 85-701 (Supp. 1972).
Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 129, 219 N.W.2d 726, 730 (1974).
Id. at 132-33, 219 N.W.2d at 733-34.
Id. at 134, 219 N.W.2d at 735.
12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
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state statutes to determine any patterns which are emerging out
of the state courts.
A.

Assistance in selling bonds

Acts of South Carolina, New Jersey and California providing
state assistance in the selling of bonds, the proceeds of which
inure to private colleges, have all been found valid. In no instance
were there state revenues used or obligated.2 4 '
B.

Student loans

The provision of low cost state loans to students of higher
education (including private colleges) has been upheld in South
Carolina and Virginia. In South Carolina no state money was involved or obligated. In Virginia repayment options for churchrelated college students are limited to bonafide service to the
state or money.2 4
C.

Contracts for special educational services

Wisconsin's Act to contract with a church-related college for
the provision of dentistry education for the state's residents
violated the Federal Constitution. State payment for services
under the Act released funds to the general revenues of the
college. The most serious defect noted was the intrusion of the
state into the affairs of the college through regulating stipulations.2 49
D.

Grants restricted to construction purposes

Federal funds for construction purposes at private, churchrelated colleges were approved. No evidence was offered on the
sectarian nature of individual college recipients; the aid was
ideologically neutral; of a one-time, single-purpose, limited contact
nature; and provided for a limited and narrow relationship between church and state" °
E.

Grants unrestricted in nature

Maryland's unrestricted grants to private, church-related
colleges were held, by a federal district court, not to violate the
247. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 784 (1973); California Education Facilities Authority v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974) ;
Clayton v. Kerrick, 59 N.J. 583, 285 A.2d 11 (1971)-decided after Tilton,
but prior to Hunt.
248. Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972); Miller
v. Ayers, 214 Va. 171, 198 S.E.2d 634 (1973).
249. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972).
250. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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United States Constitution. The court cited as reasons academic
freedom at the colleges, the Act's exemption of theological schools
and prohibition against usage of funds for sectarian purposes,
and requirements that college presidents verify biannually that
the terms of the Act were adhered to.
In New York unrestricted grants to the College of New
Rochelle were approved under the state and the Federal Constitution. New York's Act provides for review of the degree of
sectarianism of individual colleges." '
F. Tuition grants
Supreme courts of Washington, Alabama and Nebraska have
held tuition grants for private, church-related college students to
violate their state constitutions and the Federal Constitution. A
federal district court has held a Kansas Act valid and invalid,
depending upon the degree of sectarianism present at individual
colleges. And a federal district court has held Tennessee's Act
unconstitutional. This decision has been accepted for review by
the United States Supreme Court, and should provide some strongly
needed guidelines for state grants to private, religiously-affiliated
2
colleges or their students."
251. Roemer v. Board of Public Works of the State of Maryland, 387
F. Supp. 1282 (D.Md. 1974); College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 37 App.
Div. 2d 461, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1971). See also Canisius College v. Nyquist, 36
App. Div. 2d 340, 320 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1971); Iona College v. Nyquist, 65 Misc.
2d 329, 316 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1970).
252. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Dunn,
384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974); Opinion of the
Justices, 291 Ala. 301, 280 So. 2d 547 (1973) ; State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson,
192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974); Weiss v. O'Brien, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509
P.2d 973 (1973). In addition, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held a
tuition grant act invalid under the state constitution. The case was decided
after Tilton was argued, but prior to the decision. See Hartness v. Patterson,
255 S.C. 503, 197 S.E.2d 907 (1971).
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